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THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE FOLLOWING
BERLIN v. SARAH BUSH LINCOLN
HEAL TH CENTER
Jessica A. Axelrod*
INTRODUCTION
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine requires that all medical
decisions be made by licensed medical professionals.' Currently, modem
attempts to follow this proscription have produced confusion in health
care institutions about the unauthorized practice of medicine.
Courts have interpreted the corporate practice doctrine to prohibit the
employment of persons acting as physicians by any entity, other than a
professional corporation2 or health maintenance organization, even if the
entity performs strictly business functions.3 However, the current health
care environment has developed in ways that differ greatly from the one
in which the corporate practice of medicine prohibition originated
In recent years, the health care industry has developed into a cost-
conscious environment.5 Corporations have introduced alternative
"Staff Writer, DEPAULJLOFHEALTH CAPE L.B.A., Binghamton University, SUNY, 1996;
J.D. (Cand.), DePaul University, 1999.
'George F. Indest, III & Barbara A. Egolf, Is Medicine Headed for an Assembly Line?
Exploring the Doctrine of the Unauthorized Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 BUS. L. TODAY 32,
33 (1997).
2A distinction must be drawn between professional corporations and lay corporations.
Professional corporations are those owned and controlled by licensed physicians. Lay
corporations are owned and controlled by people who are not licensed to practice medicine. For
the purposes of this Comment, "corporation" will refer to lay corporation unless otherwise stated.
'Lisa Rediger Hayward, Note and Comment, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REV. 403, 403 (1996).4Jeffery F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445,447 (1987).
5al at 478.
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systems of health care delivery with cost containment measures that often
conflict with traditional notions of professional autonomy.6 In other
words, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has failed to keep up
with changes in the way health care services are organized, delivered, and
financed.7
"Preserving the facade that the corporate practice of medicine
prohibition requires a complete bar to corporations employing licensed
physicians causes confusion by distorting the realities of modem medical
practices."' Physicians threatened by a loss of autonomy, and states
attempting to regulate competition in the health care field, are the most
common parties in corporate practice litigation.9 One such suit, Berlin v.
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center,"0 has far-reaching policy implications
regarding the doctrine.
Part I of this Article will cover the background of the doctrine,
including its origin, rationale, and development." Part II will consist of
a brief state survey of current legal trends surrounding the corporate
practice of medicine.' 2 Part III will analyze the impact of the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Berlin." Finally, Part IV will suggest
changes in state and federal legislation in light of the Berlin decision. 4
BACKGROUND
Origin of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Physicians of the nineteenth century competed for patients not only among
themselves, but also with others who had not obtained a traditional
medical education. 5 Independent physicians were also forced to compete
6Id.
7Hayward, supra note 3, at 417.
8Sara Mars, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7 HEALTH
MATRIX 241,253 (1997).
9Chase-Lubitz, supra note 4, at 447.
10Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106 (I1. 1997).
"See infra Part I.
'
2See infra Part II.
"See infra Part Ill.
4See infra Part IV.
"
5Chase-Lubitz, supra note 4, at 448.
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with contract practices.' 6 In these arrangements, corporations employed
physicians to treat employees working in isolated industries.
17
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine developed to protect
consumers from receiving substandard care at the hands of medical
professionals hired by non-physicians. 8 The prohibition cannot be traced
to one direct source of law; it has emerged through a combination of state
medical practice acts and public policy arguments developed by state
courts.'9
Policy Justifications for the Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Three main justifications are given in support of the corporate practice
prohibition. First, physician employment by lay corporations may reduce
physician autonomy over medical judgments." Courts have traditionally
been concerned with protecting physician-patient relationships from being
undermined by the intrusion of a lay corporation not bound by medical
ethics.2' Second, employed physicians may experience a sense of divided
loyalty between their profit-seeking employer and their treatment-seeking
patients. n The disjointed interests of physicians in patient well-being, and
corporations in shareholder satisfaction, may jeopardize the quality and
delivery of health care. Third, public policy arguments have been raised
to attack the commercialization of health care and the possible
exploitation of patients.' Many critics worry that investors will pressure
physicians to sell their services to obtain large profits, thereby
emphasizing profitability over patient care.2"
All of these justifications embrace the image of the solo family
practitioner, completely independent from outside control, who is kept
from exploiting his dependent. patients by professional ethics. This
'
6Mars, supra note 8, at 247.17Id.
"SHayward, supra note 3, at 404.
'Mars, supra note 8, at 242.
201d. at 249.
2tChase-Lubitz, supra note 4, at 469 (arguing that "by allowing lay-controlled corporations
to provide medical services, lay people not subject to the physicians' ethical code would be free
to solicit patients and advertise competitively").
'Mars, supra note 8, at 243.2
'1d.
241d. at 249.
2'd.
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characterization has been deemed anachronistic given the state of modem
health care because this traditional type of provider is rapidly disappearing
due to the integration of the health care industry.26
Development of the Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine
The doctrine prohibiting the unauthorized corporate practice of medicine
is a mix of common law, statutory law, and ethical rules established by the
medical profession. Each state has a statute governing the licensing of
28physicians. These statutes, or "medical practice acts," usually make it
a criminal offense for anyone not possessing a valid license to practice
medicine.29
Courts that derive a rule against corporate practice, therefore, deduce
that corporations employing physicians are engaging in the practice of
medicine without themselves being licensed." Because corporations are
not natural persons, they cannot meet the requirements of state licensure
acts such as obtaining a medical degree, being of a certain age, and being
of good moral character.3
Exceptions to the Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine
State court decisions and legislative acts have created exceptions to the
general rule against the corporate practice of medicine.32 Certain types of
corporations may legally hire physicians or share in physician-employee
incomes.33 The problem with these exceptions is that although the
qualified entities do not violate the doctrine per se, the policy concerns are
2Interview with Jeff Atkinson, Adjunct Professor, DePaul University College of Law; sole
practitioner, Wilmette, Illinois. B.A., Northwestern University, 1974; J.D., DePaul University,
1997, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 8, 1997).
27Indest & Egolf, supra note 1, at 34.281d.291d.
301d.
3 Id. at 33; see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 4, at 464-65 (stating most medical practice
acts are simple licensure statutes listing qualifications needed to obtain a license and requiring no
person practice without one).
32Hayward, supra note 3, at 410.331ndest & Egolf, supra note 1, at 34.
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just as prevalent in these arrangements as with non-exempt corporate
entities.34
A general exception exists for professional corporations.3s All states
have adopted statutes, which authorize licensed professionals to form
corporations to engage in the practice of medicine. 6 These statutes
usually require that all shareholders and officers of the corporation be
licensed in the same profession.37
Certain states recognize an exception for medical schools and
teaching hospitals.38 These states allow approved medical schools to
employ physicians in furtherance of medical science and instruction. "
The difference between not-for-profit and for-profit corporations can
affect application of the doctrine.4" States may choose to distinguish
between not-for-profit and for-profit corporations and refuse to apply the
doctrine to the former.41 The rationale courts generally give for excluding
non-profit organizations is that the policy concerns underlying the
corporate prohibition (commercial exploitation, divided loyalty, and lay
control of physicians) disappear when the profit motive is removed.4
A large, federally mandated exception covers health maintenance
organizations.43 HMO development became a priority in the 1970s as a
mechanism to curb rising health care costs." However, state laws
prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine posed a significant obstacle
to HMO growth. In response to this problem, numerous states voluntarily
adopted legislation that expressly exempted application of the corporate
practice doctrine to HMOs.45
Fundamental differences between independent contractors and
physician-employees have an impact on the corporate practice of medicine
'Mars, supra note 8, at 252.
3 Hayward, supra note 3, at 410-11.
3 Id.
371d.
"
3lndest & Egolf, supra note 1, at 34.391d
4 See e.g., Mars, supra note 8, at 256 ("Some state legislatures and courts have recognized
not-for-profit hospitals as an exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctnne").4 tHayward, supra note 3, at 410.42Id.
43Mars, supra note 8, at 259.
"Hayward, supra note 3, at 411.
"Id.; see also Mars, supra note 8, at 259.
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doctrine.4 6 By definition, independent contractors cannot engage in the
corporate practice of medicine, because they are not employed by the
hospital and retain individual licenses to practice.47  Therefore,
independent contracting physicians do not create the same threat of lay
control and divided loyalties as do other arrangements.48
Another exception that is sometimes recognized allows corporations
to hire physicians in a consulting capacity.41 In this situation, corporations
can hire physicians directly, because the physician may have no direct
patient-care responsibilities and, therefore, is removed from the direct
practice of medicine.5 This arrangement eliminates the concern that the
corporation is engaging in the practice of medicine.5
Certain states allow for the employment of physicians by employer-
sponsored health plans and school health programs to provide treatment
for employees or students.52 This exception is justified by the fact these
programs are not held out to the general public and do not typically charge
the patient a fee.
53
ANALYSIS
Different Approaches Taken to Apply the Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Since treating patients affects public health and safety, state legislatures
can exert their police power to regulate the practice of medicine.54
Licensure and medical practice act requirements serve an important
function given the trust and reliance patients place in their physicians to
render adequate health care.55 However, a problem arises with respect to
state licensure laws and medical practice acts due to the courts' wide
interpretation and application of.these regulations. 6
'Mars, supra note 8, at 263.47jd
"4SId.
49lndest & Egolf, supra note 1, at 35.
sold.
5 11d.52Id.
531d.
54Mars, supra note 8, at 248.
551d.
561d
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States vary on the extent to which they recognize and/or enforce a
corporate practice of medicine prohibition." Generally, states can be
divided into three groups.58 Most states recognizing the prohibition
enforce it subject to certain exceptions. 59 Other states have either an
outright statutory or common law ban on certain entities employing
physicians.' ° The remaining states either do not have a corporate practice
prohibition, or if one exists, simply refuse to enforce it.
61
In states recognizing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
subject to certain exceptions, a greatly disputed issue is the proper scope
of those exceptions. Exceptions which permit hospitals to practice
medicine by employing physicians vary widely in their approach. 2
Certain states explicitly authorize physician employment by hospitals,
while other states only recognize an exception for not-for-profit
'For a comprehensive survey of all fifty states and their respective stances on the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine, see D. Cameron Dobbins, Survcy of State Laws Relating to the
Corporate Practice of Medicine, 9 Health Lawyer, May 1997 at 18 (covenng each states position
on the doctrine, as interpreted by both statutory and common law).
'he states do not fall into three precise categories. These generalizations have been mrede
to aid the analysis of this Article.
SSee, eg., Colorado Medical Practice Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(m) (West 1998)
(defining unprofessional conduct as "practicing medicine as an employee of... any corporation
other than a professional service corporation for the practice of medicine"); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-3-103.2 (West 1998) (providing that licensed hospitals may employ health care
professionals only if located in counties with a population less than 100,000).
6 Texas, for example, has a strong and strictly enforced prohibition against the corporate
practice of medicine. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, §§ 3.07(0, 3.OS(12), and
3.08(15) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (providing that it is unlawful for a physician to allow another to use
his license or to aid or abet the practice of medicine by any unlice sed per-son, partnership,
association, or corporation); see also Garcia v. Texas Bd. of Medical Examiners, 3&4 F. Supp. 434
(,V.D.Tex. 1974), aff'd., 421 U.S. 995.
6
'A typical example can be found in Arkansas where the state legislature has enacted
standard medical licensing and professional corporation acts, but no court has held there to be a
prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine. See Arkan-as Medical Practice Act, AP1.
CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 et seq. (restricting the privilege of practicing medicine to individuals)
(The State of Arkansas 1987-1947).
62Edward Kornreich, Health Care M & A: Update on Major Regulatory Legislative and
Industry Initiatives, 984 P.L.I. Corp. 101, at 141 (1997). Thirty-seven states have either an
outright statutory or common law ban on unlicensed entities employing physicians, or have
authority implying such a prohibition, yet enforcement is sporadic regarding the employment of
physicians by hospitals. "[A]II but five states (California, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas)
appear to allow not-for-profit ... hospitals to directly employ their staff physicians. However,
many of the remaining thirty-two states with ostensible bans have old precedent forbidding
hospital employment of physicians which has yet to be formally repealed or overruled').
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hospitals.63 In contrast, some states recognize an unwritten exception,
which permits all hospitals to employ staff physicians.64
Background of Berlin v. Sarah Bush
Lincoln Health Center
Sarah Bush Lincoln H-alth Center (Hospital) is a not-for-profit
corporation that owns and operates a general hospital in Coles County,
Illinois.65 The Hospital services a medically underserved and
predominantly rural area of Illinois.66 In furthering its charitable purposes,
the Hospital recruits and retains physicians in order to alleviate an existing
and projected shortage of primary care physicians and specialists.67
In 1992, the Hospital recruited Richard B. Berlin, Jr., M.D., a board-
certified general surgeon with specialized training in surgical oncology.
68
The Hospital entered an employment agreement whereby Dr. Berlin
would receive an annual salary plus quarterly production bonuses. 69 The
employment agreement between Dr. Berlin and the Hospital provided that
the Hospital would neither have nor exercise control over the professional
aspects of Dr. Berlin's practice. However, the agreement emphasized that
Dr. Berlin was required to render medical services and comply with the
policies, standards, and regulations established by the Hospital.70 The
agreement also included a restrictive covenant covering a fifty-mile radius
and lasting for the duration of the agreement, plus two years thereafter.7'
In February 1994, Dr. Berlin resigned from the Hospital and became
an employee of a clinic located approximately one mile from the
Hospital.72 The Hospital filed a motion for injunctive relief against Dr.
Berlin, and Dr. Berlin was subsequently enjoined from working for any
competing health care provider within a fifty-mile radius of the Hospital.73
6 Judith Parker, Corporate Practice of Medicine: Last Stand or Final Downfall?, 29 J.
HEALTH&HOSP. L. 160, 161 (1996).
&4d.
65Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 279 Ill. App. 3d 447, 664 N.E.2d 337, 215 111.
Dec. 940 (Ill. 1986).
6Id.
67Id.
68Id.
69Id.
7'Berlin, No. 4-95-0569 slip op.
71Id.
72Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337, 339 (11. 1996).
BId.
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Dr. Berlin appealed the preliminary injunction, and the appellate court
reversed and remanded the case, holding the trial court had improperly
denied Dr. Berlin's motion for substitution ofjudge7 4
In January 1995, Dr. Berlin filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment and a motion for summary judgment in which he sought to have
the restrictive covenant declared unenforceable. 7 The Hospital filed a
cross-motion for summaryjudgment 6 The trial court granted Dr. Berlin's
motion for summary judgment, finding the restrictive covenant was not
enforceable because of the prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine. 77 The Hospital appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.73
Four main points summarize the appellate court's decision. Initially,
the appellate court felt it was bound by stare decisis to follow the
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in Dr. Allison, Dentist v. Allison,9'
and People ex rel Kerner v. United Medical Service.'" Both of these
decisions interpreted the Medical Practice Act of 1923 and found that
corporations cannot be licensed to practice medicine.8'
Next, the court decided that since the state legislature had created
statutory exceptions to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, any
decision to expand the scope of these exceptions must also come from the
legislature.sZ To date, the legislature had addressed hospitals as
'Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr. v. Berlin, 643 N.E.2d 276, 280-81,205 111. D.ec. 325,329-
30 (111. 1994).
'Berlin, 664 N.E.2d at 339.76Id.
77Id.
711d at 345..
'Dentist v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799 (III. 1935) ("The practice of a profe: ion is
everywhere held to be subject to licensing and regulation under the police power and not subject
to commercialization or exploitation. [Citation.] ... The qualifications [to practice medicine]
include personal characteristics, such as honesty, guided by an upright conscience and a sense of
loyalty to clients or patients, even to the extent of sacrificing pecuniary profit, if necezzary. ... No
corporation can qualify").
"People ex rel Kerner v. United Medical Serv., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (Ill. 1936)
(rejecting the corporation's contention that its fee arrangement, whereby patients paid fees directly
to the corporation, did not interfere with the professional relationship betveen the patients and the
licensed physicians who treated them, and accordingly finding that a corporation violates. the 1923
Medical Practice Act when it employs physicians to practice medicine because a corporation
cannot be so licensed).
"Berlin, 664 N.E.2d at 341.
'
21d. at 342.
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employers, but it had never addressed hospitals as employers of
physicians.8 3
On the question of whether to depart from precedent in order to
recognize an exception to the doctrine prohibiting the corporate practice
of medicine, the court stated the primary expression of Illinois social
policy should emanate from the legislature, especially regarding issues
where there is disagreement over whether a new rule is warranted.84
Finally, as an implied exception to the corporate practice doctrine, the
Hospital argued it qualified under section four of the 1987 Medical
Practice Act, which provides that the Act shall not apply to persons
lawfully carrying on their particular profession or business under any valid
existing regulatory Act of this State.85 The court found, however, that
simply because hospitals must be licensed under the Illinois Hospital
Licensing Act 6 does not mean they qualify for an exception under the
1987 Medical Practice Act.87
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, the appellate court
determined the trial court was correct in granting Dr. Berlin's motion for
summary judgment.8 8 The appellate court also agreed that the Hospital,
through its general surgery agreement with Dr. Berlin, violated the
statutory prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine.8 9 One justice
of the appellate court dissented, stating that any prohibition on
corporations engaging in health services did not prohibit the Hospital's
employment of Dr. Berlin.90
In the early part of 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the
Hospital's petition for leave to appeal.9'
The Illinois Supreme Court's Decision in Berlin
Because the facts were not in dispute, the supreme court adopted the
statement of facts as set out in the appellate court's decision. 92 On appeal,
"Id
"Id. at 344. (quoting Charles v. Seigfiied, 651 N.E.2d 154, 160 (1995)).
'
51d.(quoting) 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/4 (West 1994)).
86210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1 et seq. (West 1994).
"Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 279 11. App. 3d 447, 459, 664 N.E.2d 337, 344
(II 1996).
88Id.
891d.
9Id. at 346 (McCullough, J., dissenting).
"Sarah Bush Hosp. v. Berlin, 155 Ill.2d R. 315(a) (1997).
9"Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E. 2d 106, 107-08 (I11. 1997).
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the court was asked to consider two issues: (1) whether the expiration of
the two-year term of the restrictive covenant of the employment
agreement rendered the appeal moot; and (2) whether the corporate
practice doctrine, as set forth in People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical
Service,93 prohibited licensed hospitals from employing physicians to
provide medical services.
94
The Illinois Supreme Court first determined the appeal was not moot s
Applying the rule that an appeal has life if its decision could have a direct
impact on the rights and duties of the parties, the court concluded that this
appeal was not moot.96 This appeal was still relevant to the parties,
because its outcome would affect their particular relationship, as well as
public policy generally.97 A determination that hospitals are prohibited
from employing physicians could force the Hospital to alter its working
relationships with its medical staff.98 Also, such a finding could subject
both parties to various penalties for violations of the Medical Practice Act
of 1987.99 Conversely, a determination that hospitals may legally employ
physicians may mean the Hospital has various causes of action for breach
of contract.'0
The court next turned to an analysis of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. After setting forth the definition and rationale behind
the prohibition, the court considered its application in Illinois."'0
Recognizing that prior to the instant action no Illinois court had applied
the corporate practice of medicine rule or specifically addressed the issue
of whether licensed hospitals are prohibited from employing physicians,
the court looked to otherjurisdictions with respect to the application of the
corporate practice doctrine to hospitals.'02
After reviewing both common law and statutory authority, the court
found there are primarily three .approaches used to determine that the
corporate practice doctrine is inapplicable to hospitals. 3 First, some
93People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Serv., 200 N.E. 157 (Iil. 1936).
94Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 108.
9sil at 109.
'61d (quoting People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 316 (111. 988).97 Id
"Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 109-10 (I11. 1997).
99d at 109.
"Id at I10.
t°ZId at 111.
'°Id at 112.
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
states refused to adopt the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
altogether. °4 These states determined a hospital that employs physicians
is not practicing medicine, but rather is merely making medical treatment
available.' °5 Second, other jurisdictions determined the corporate practice
doctrine does not apply to not-for-profit hospitals, because the public
policy arguments supporting the doctrine do not apply to physicians
employed by charitable institutions.0 6 Third, several states decided the
doctrine does not apply to hospitals that employ physicians because
hospitals are authorized by other laws to provide treatment to patients. 107
The court found the rationale of the latter two approaches persuasive,
and combined them to reach a new result: refusing to apply the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine to any licensed hospital."'
To distinguish Kerner, the court pointed out that the Medical Practice
Act contains no express prohibition on the corporate employment of
physicians."' Rather, the doctrine was inferred from the general policies
supporting the Act."0 The appellant in Kerner was a general corporation
possessing no licensed authority to offer medical services to the public."'1
The corporate practice prohibition was designed to apply in such a
situation. However, when a corporation has been licensed by the state to
operate a hospital, as in the present case, the prohibition is inapplicable."'
Support for the court's position was found in a number of legislative
enactments which implied the authority to employ licensed physicians to
provide medical services." 3 In accordance with the policies underlying
"'Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 112 (111. 1997).
"5Id
106Id.
'Id. at 112.
'"Id. at 112-13.
"Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 112-13 (III. 1997).
1OId.
"lid. at 113.
1 2Id.
'"SeeBerlin, 688 N.E.2d at 113, citing the Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/3 (West
Supp. 1995) (defining "hospital" as: "any institution, place, building, or agency, public or private,
whether organized for profit or not, devoted primarily to the .maintenance and operation of
facilities for the diagnosis and treatment or care of *** persons admitted for overnight stay or
longer in order to obtain medical, including obstetric, psychiatric and nursing, care of illness,
disease, injury, infirmity, or deformity"); Hospital Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/0.01 C1 scq.
(West 1994) (providing "[e]very hospital rendering service in the treatment, care and maintenance,
of such injured person" a lien upon a patient's personal injury cause of action); Hospital
Emergency Service Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/0.01 et seq. (West 1994) (requiring "[e]very
hospital *** which provides general medical and surgical hospital services" to also provide
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these statutes, the court refused to distinguish between for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals.114
As to public policy, the court found the traditional concerns that
supported the corporate practice doctrine were inapplicable to licensed
hospitals in the modem health care industry."15 Extensive changes,
particularly the emergence of corporate health maintenance organizations,
have minimized the concern over the commercialization of health care." 6
When a licensed hospital is the physician's employer this concern is
relieved because hospitals have an independent duty to provide for the
patient's welfare.
17
Accordingly, a licensed hospital possesses legislative authority to
practice medicine by employing a staff of physicians and is excepted
from the corporate practice of medicine doctrine."'
Justice Harrison dissented from the opinion."9 He stated the court did
not have the power to amend a statute, and that adding another exception
to the specific list is tantamount to changing the law.' Where a statute
specifies exceptions to a general rule, only those designated by the
legislature will be recognized.'
Justice Harrison failed to see any support for the majority's reliance on
the cited statutes." Under the dissent's interpretation, none of these laws
require that hospitals have the power to employ physicians directly."
The dissent also noted the Medical Practice Act contains a provision
for the exemption of certain entities, subject to the discretion of the
General Assembly. The legislature had already exempted employment
of physicians by health maintenance organizations. and professional
emergency services).
'Id. at 113.
11ld
"
6Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (I!1. 1997).
"t71d
lIS'd.
'Id at 115.
.
2 Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (111. 1997).
"l-d at 116.
"-2Id The Medical Practice Act provides it is inapplicable to "persons lawfully carrying on
their particular profession or business under any valid existing regulatory Act of this State." 225
ILL. CoMP. STAT. 60/4 (West 1994).
"'Id. See Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. CoNMp. STAT. 125/1-1 et seq.
(West 1994) (authorizing the employment of physicians by health maintenance organizations).
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organizations.'2 6 Presumably, therefore, if the General Assembly had
intended to grant the same authority to hospitals, it would have explicitly
done so.1
27
In light of these reasons, the dissent agreed with the appellate court's
decision that the corporate practice doctrine prohibited the Hospital from
entering into an employment agreement with Dr. Berlin, and therefore, the
agreement, including its restrictive covenant, was void and
unenforceable. 2
Policy Implications of the Illinois Supreme
Court's Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Berlin seems to have been
anticipated by another case decided in March of 1997 by the Illinois Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Holden v. Rockford Memorial
Hosp.,129 Dr. Holden and Rockford Memorial Hospital (Hospital) entered
into an employment agreement on May 28, 1993.131 Pursuant to the
agreement, Dr. Holden was an employee of the Hospital and was to
provide reproductive endocrinology services in that department."'
Furthermore, Dr. Holden was to devote all professional practice time to,
or on behalf of and at the discretion of, the hospital."2 The employment
agreement also contained a restrictive covenant that was to last for two
years after termination of employment, and cover certain surrounding
counties. 1
33
On October 26, 1995, Dr. Holden submitted his resignation, and five
months later, he filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief seeking a declaration that his employment agreement with the
'
261d. See generally Professional Service Corporation Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 el
seq. (West 1994) (allowing physicians to incorporate); Medical Corporation Act, 805 ILL. COMPi.
STAT. 15/1 (West 1994) (permitting physicians to form corporations to provide medical services);
Professional Association Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/I et seq. (West 1994) (granting
physicians the right to practice in a professional association); Limited Liability Company Act, 805
ILL Coaw. STAT. 180/1-1 et seq. (West 1996) (giving physicians the right to organize and operate
limited liability companies to practice medicine).
'"Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 116 (II1. 1997).
1291d.
"gHolden v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 678 N.E.2d 342 (I11. 1997).
"1Od. at 343.311d.
132jd.
'"id.
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Hospital was void and unenforceable as a matter of law." The Hospital
filed a counterclaim for injunctive relief against Dr. Holden and damages
from his breach of the employment agreement.135
The court in Holden was faced with the same issue presented in Berlin
- whether hospital employment of physicians was equivalent to practicing
medicine, in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 36
Even though the employment agreement in Holden was declared invalid
as a violation of the corporate practice prohibition, the court clearly
acknowledged the realities of modem health care and stressed that it came
to its decision only by way of deference to the state supreme court' 37
In its conclusion, the court stated the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine arose in response to fears that corporate involvement in medicine
would restrict physicians' independence, commercialize medical practice,
and threaten physician/patient loyalty. However, the health care industry
has changed drastically since the doctrine was established.' Hence,
prohibiting hospitals from employing physicians in the present day may
do more harm than good.13
9
Despite this recognition and the apparent willingness to change the
state of the law, the court declined the opportunity, stating that it was not
its place to implement new law or institute new policy regarding the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 4 ' Instead, the Illinois Supreme
Court's precedent, set sixty years ago, still provides the definition of
"practicing medicine.' 14'
Now that the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled on the issue and
declared that hospitals do not violate the corporate practice prohibition by
"Holden v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 678 N.E.2d 342 (Il1. 1997).
13Sd
'37Id. at 348.
"aId at 347. See also, Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hop., 332,211 N.E.2d
253 (Ill. 1965), quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3,8 (1957) ('The conception that the hoapital
does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its physicians and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility no longer
reflect the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far
more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as administrative and manual workers, and they
charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if nees-sary, by legal
action."').
"'Holden v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. 678 N.E.2d at 347 (111. 997).
1 d. at 348.1411d.
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employing physicians, the decision may provide the impetus for change
in the legislature. The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court will also
have a significant effect on how the corporate practice of medicine
prohibition is interpreted and applied throughout the nation. Because
another court has been persuaded that a medical facility's employment of
physicians is acceptable and does not violate the corporate practice
doctrine, other states may follow this rationale and bring the reality of
modem medical care in line with statutory and common law provisions.
IMPACT
Some courts have adopted the reasoning that since a corporation is unable
to obtain a medical license, it cannot practice medicine.'42 This overlooks
the fact that corporations do not purport to practice medicine in the strict
sense that physicians do.' 43 The more logical interpretation of state
licensure and medical practice acts would be to allow employment
relationships between medical corporations and physicians." Entering
into employment contracts should be distinguished from diagnosing or
treating a patient. Otherwise, the purpose of state medical practice acts
and licensure requirements would be stretched to an illogical breaking
point.1
45
Most courts have been reluctant to distinguish between a physician's
professional services and a lay person's administrative duties, holding that
corporations are illegally practicing medicine based solely on their
employment of physicians. 46 Several courts, however, have accepted the
distinction between the professional and managerial facets of a medical
corporation. 141
The courts recognizing this difference distinguish between a
corporation's managing certain functions and the actual furnishing of
medical services by professionals, such that the mere employment of
physicians does not equate with practicing medicine. In Connecticut, the
business of providing health care personnel does not translate into the
" 
2Mars, supra note 8, at 250.
131"d.
'"Id. at 251.
1451d.
'"Chase-Lubitz, supra note 4, at 468.
1471d.
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business of caring for patients." New Jersey also acknowledges that non-
professional business matters, such as paying office expenses and
managing business records, do not constitute practicing medicine under
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 49 The Kansas Supreme Court
stated the general position most accurately when it announced that
requiring a hospital to accomplish what it is licensed to do "without
employing physicians is not only illogical but ignores reality."'50
Other courts are not faced with a problem in this area because they
never interpreted the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as
prohibiting hospitals from employing physicians. 5' Alternatively, some
state legislatures have avoided the problem by limiting the scope of the
corporate practice doctrine.'
The main issue in allowing hospitals to employ physicians is whether
the relationship between a physician and the hospital patient becomes so
transformed as to allow the hospital to become the medical practitioner." 3
"SSee Daw's Critical Care Registry v. Department of Labor, Employment Security Div.,
622 A.2d 622,636, (CT. 1992), aft'd, 622 A2d 518 (CT. 1993) (distinguishing cbtween operiting
a health facility and practicing medicine because the health facility did not have control over how
services were provided to the patients).
"'See Women's Med. Ctr. v. Finley, 469 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1983), cert. denied, 475 A2d 578
(1984) (stating all health care providers must perform business, adrministrative, and management
chores, but as long as these functions do not "impinge upon professional control by the physicians
of the medical practice" the corporation is not practicing medicine).
"'St. Francis Regional Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 618 (KS 1994).
.'.See State Electro-Medical Inst. v. Platner, 103 N.W. 1079 (NE 1905) (separating the
professional aspects from the administrative aspects in a for-profit medical service corporation,
finding that the intent of the state medical practice statute was to assure that thoze perons
practicing medicine have sufficient personal qualifications, and noting that making contracts is not
practicing medicine, thus, no restrictions exist if one is not actually diagnosing or treating dieea-);
State ex rel. Sager v. Lewin, 106 S.W. 581 (MO 1907) (construing the state medical practice act
as granting corporations the same rights as individuals to contract with physicians to provide
medical care, and finding support in private hospitals' ability to incorporate to furnish medical
services through licensed physicians); Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. 1938),
aff'dsub nom., Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (refusing to apply
the corporate practice rule to an arrangement in which a health association employed physicians
because the physicians were independent contractors, rather than agents of the corporation).
'2See, eg., S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 364-8.1 (Michie Supp. 1995) ("A corporation is
not engaged in the practice of medicine ... and is not in violation of [this section] by entering into
an employment agreement with a physician licensed pursuant to this chapter if the agreement or
the relationship it creates does not? ... [I]n any manner, directly or indirectly, supplant, diminish
or regulate the physician's independent judgment concerning the practice of medicine or the
diagnosis and treatment of any patient").
'53St. Francis Regional Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 615, quoting Rush v. City of St.
Petersburg, 205 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. App. 1967).
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A better test to determine whether one is practicing medicine in the sense
covered by state licensure and medical practice acts is whether or not one
holds himself out as being able to diagnose or treat any human disease or
physical condition.'54 Unless a corporation is interfering with its
physicians' medical judgments, there is no basis for the continued
prohibitions on employment arrangements that have been held to violate
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.'
CONCLUSION
"As the complexity of health care delivery system[s] increases, the
continued viability of the corporate practice doctrine becomes
questionable in light of its 'chilling effect' on the development of
innovative health care delivery approaches which further cost containment
efforts."' 56 It is difficult to reconcile cases which hold that the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine is being violated simply because a
corporation is employing physicians, with the more logical interpretation
of the doctrine that recognizes a distinction between professional duties
and managerial or administrative responsibilities.'57
A better policy would be to allow corporations to employ physicians
as long as the physicians retain their freedom of action. 8 In this scenario,
the problems of lay control, divided loyalty, and commercialism would
have little effect on the physician-patient relationship.'59 By focusing on
the physicians' freedom of action, courts will no longer be confined by
abstract notions of corporate form.16
0
Even though the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is outdated,
it should not be abolished.' 6' It must, however, be modified to adapt to the
current movement toward managed care and integrated health care
delivery systems. The doctrine should only serve to protect physician
'-Rush, 205 So. 2d 11 (quoting Watson v. Centro Espanol DeTarnpa, 158 Fla. 796, 30 So.
2d 288 (1947)).
ISMars, supra note 8, at 251-52.
'
56Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Prohibition: A Dinosaur
Awaiting Extinction, 27 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 369, 372 (1994).
ISMars, supra note 8, at 265.
'"id.
1597d.
16da
"'Hayward, supra note 3, at 428.
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sovereignty in health care decisions. 62 Narrowed in this manner, the
doctrine can benefit both physicians and patients without infringing on the
corporate entity's role to contain costs and monitor quality.
163

